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and Federal Rule 13(a)
The rationale of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins jeopardizes the
applicability of many of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in diversity cases. The author of this Note analyzes
both the nature of the federal compulsory counterclaim
provision and the current standing of the Erie doctrine.
He concludes that the strong federal policies behind the
compulsory counterclaim rule require that it be applied
in diversity cases.
In the leading case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,' the Supreme
Court ruled that the federal courts are bound to apply state law
in adjudicating nonfederal questions involving substantive rules
of law. The impact of this case was profound and far-reaching;
Judge Learned Hand was once moved to remark, "I don't suppose
a civil appeal can now be argued to us without counsel sooner or
later quoting large portions of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins."' The
same year that the Erie case was decided, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were adopted to "govern the procedure in the
United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature . . .,3
Since the distinction between substance and procedure is often a
shadowy one and since the procedural rules of the states often dif-
fer from the Federal Rules, the doctrine of the Erie case raises
some doubts as to the applicability of the Rules in diversity cases
where most of the issues involved are nonfederal in nature.
The answer to the question of the relationship between the Erie
doctrine and the Federal Rules has thus far come only on an ad
hoc basis since each of the Rules poses different problems with
different underlying considerations." This Note will attempt to sug-
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. As quoted in Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brood-
ing Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1946).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
4. See cases cited in notes 86-88 infra; Note, 26 FoR.tm L. REv. 694(1954); Note, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1030 (1949); Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 75(1959).
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gest an answer to that question in regard to one Rule not yet
considered by the courts-Rule 13(a). This Rule provides:
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim
any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not
be so stated if at the time the action was commenced the claim was
the subject of another pending action.
To achieve this objective, the history, policy, and effect of com-
pelling counterclaims will be explored; then the current standing of
the Erie doctrine will be examined; and finally the question
whether the federal compulsory counterclaim rule applies in di-
versity cases will be considered in light of these considerations.
I.
The counterclaim concept originated as a cancellation of mu-
tual debts between the parties-at common law a defendant could
reduce plaintiff's recovery only by pleading a debt arising out of
the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim (recoupment). The
assertion by the defendant of a claim not arising out of the same
transaction was not allowed at law until provided by statute in
1729.' This statutory provision allowing the defendant to plead
his claim (set-off) was adapted from earlier equity practice.6 It
was limited to the situation where the claims of both parties were
liquidated debts, and the defendant was still not allowed affirma-
tive relief on his claim.
The first liberalizing of these stringent requirements took place
in this country. Under the state codes patterned on the Field
Code,' a defendant could plead claims arising from the same trans-
action as the plaintiff's actions or, in most states, claims founded
on any contract between the parties (counterclaim).' A defend-
5. Insolvent Debtors Relief Act, 1729, 2 Geo. 2, c. 22, § 13. An earlier
English statute allowed set-offs against an insolvent plaintiff. Bankrupts
Act, 1705, 4 & 5 Anne, c. 4, § 11. Some American jurisdictions had set-
off statutes earlier, some of which were much more modern than the Eng-
lish acts. See Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 541,
553-61 (1916).
6. See generally MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 124-25 (1952); Loyd, supra note 5, at 547-50.
7. The original Field Code of 1848, N.Y. Laws 1848, ch. 379, had no
provision for counterclaims; the counterclaim mentioned in the text was
added by amendment in 1852. N.Y. Laws 1852, ch. 392, §§ 149-50. For
those state codes adopting the New York provision, see CLARK, CODE
PLEADING § 101, at 642 n.41 (2d ed. 1947).
8. See generally CLARK, op. cit. supra note 7, § 102.
9. Id. § 103.
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ant could recover an affirmative judgment on his counterclaim,
but generally it had to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery in
some way.' ° In England, the old rules of recoupment and set-off
were finally replaced by the Judicature Act of 187311 which great-
ly liberalized the counterclaim concept by allowing the defendant
to set up as a counterclaim any claim against the plaintiff that
might be the basis for a separate action. This wide latitude in
the allowance of counterclaims has now been followed by the fed-
eral courts,' by those states which have adopted the Federal
Rules,13 and by some of the code states.' 4 As one commenta-
tor has observed, "a high degree of latitude in the admission of
counter-demands would appear . . . to have attained solid recog-
nition as one of the conspicuous desiderata of modem reform."' 5
The development of the compulsory counterclaim is of more
recent origin than that of the counterclaim itself. A few early state
codes provided for compulsory counterclaims,' 6 but Federal Rule
13(a) stems from the Federal Equity Rules of 1912 which pro-
vided that "the answer must state in short and simple form any
counter-claim arising out of the transaction which is the subject
matter of the suit . . "' ' The equity rule was interpreted to
10. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 7, § 101, at 650-52.
11. 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 24(3) (now Eng. Rules of Supreme Court,
Order XIX, rule 3).
12. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b): "Permissive Counterclaims. A pleading
may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the op-
posing party's claim." This rule was derived from old Equity R. 30, 226
U.S. 657 (1912). FED. R. Civ. P. 13(c) provides that the counterclaim
need not defeat the plaintiffs recovery and may claim relief different
in kind than that sought by the plaintiff.
13. More than 20 states have now adopted rules of procedure based in
large part on the Federal Rules and several more have revised their
rules in part in reliance on the Federal Rules. See generally 1 BARON &
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDuRE: RuLEs EDITION § 9 (rev.
ed. Wright 1960).
14. Apparently the first broad counterclaim rule was that of Iowa,
passed the year before the amendment to the Field Code mentioned in note
7 supra. Iowa Code of 1851, ch. 104, § 1740. Several other code states,
including New York, California, Illinois, and Wisconsin, have also allowed
wide latitude in the pleading of counterclaims. CLARK, op. cit. supra note
7, § 101, at 643-44.
15. MILLAR, op. cit. supra note 6, at 136.
16. See MILLAR, op. cit. supra note 6, at 137. A New Jersey statute of
1722 provided the first compulsory counterclaim rule-it provided that
all set-offs must be pleaded or defendant will " 'forever after be barred
.' " Loyd, supra note 5, at 560.
17. Equity R. 30, 226 U.S. 657 (1912). The notes to Rule 13 state: 'This
is substantially Equity Rule 30 . . . broadened to include legal as well as
equitable counterclaims." Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts, Rule 13, note 1, in 3A
BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDuRE: RuLEs EDITION
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mean that these counterclaims were barred as the basis for a sub-
sequent suit if not pleaded in the original action," and Rule 13(a)
was designed to have the same effect. 9 Rule 13(a) provides that
claims arising "out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim" must be pleaded;
Equity Rule 30 included only those claims arising out of the same
transaction. Nevertheless, Rule 13(a) still utilizes the test devel-
oped under the equity rule to determine which counterclaims
must be pleaded (any claim having a logical relationship to the
claim of the opposing party).20 About half of the states now have
some type of compulsory counterclaim rule, although not all of
these rules follow the federal model.'
423, 439 (rev. ed. Wright 1960). Rule 13 also is broader than Equity Rule
30 since it requires plaintiff to plead any claims arising from the same
transaction or occurrence as defendant's counterclaim. Speed Prods., Inc. v.
Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 222 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1955).
18. Caflisch v. Humble, 251 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1918); Marconi Wireless
Tel. Co. v. National Elec. Signaling Co., 206 Fed. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1913).
19. Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 13, note 7, in 3A BARRON & HOLT-
ZOFF, op. cit. supra note 17, at 439.
20. This test was first set out by the Supreme Court in Moore v. New
York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926): " 'Transaction' is a word
of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, de-
pending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon
their logical relationship." It has been often applied in cases under Rule 13
(a). E.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.
1961); Lesnik v. Public Indust. Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944); Rosen-
thal v. Fowler, 12 F.R.D. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See also 3 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 13.13 (2d ed. 1948). For a thorough examination of the mean-
ing of "transaction or occurrence," see Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The
Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Pleading, 38 MINN. L. REV.
423, 437-45 (1954).
The preliminary draft of the Federal Rules did not include the word "oc-
currence." CHERRY, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, Preliminary
Draft of the Rules of Civil Procedure 32 (1938). It has been suggested
that "transaction" is broader in scope than "occurrence" and that the lat-
ter has no purpose other than clarifying the former. Williams v. Robinson,
1 F.R.D. 211, 213 (D.D.C. 1940).
Rule 13(a) excludes certain counterclaims even though they are logi-
cally related to the opposing party's claim: those that require third parties
over which the court has no jurisdiction; those that are not held by the
defendant at the time he serves his pleading; those that are the subject of
a pending action when the current action is commenced.
21. As mentioned in note 13 supra, about 20 states have now adopted
the federal rules, and in all of them except Minnesota and New Jersey the
compulsory counterclaim provision is similar in effect to Rule 13(a).
MINN. R. Civ. P. 13.01 is identical to Rule 13(a) except that "or occur-
rence" is omitted. The effect of, and the reason for, this change is to elimi-
nate the compelling of counterclaiming tort claims. House v. Hanson, 245
Minn. 466, 72 N.W.2d 874 (1955). N.J. RULE 4:13-1 only compels the
counterclaim of "a liquidated debt or demand, or a debt or demand capable
of being ascertained by calculation . . . ." This rejects Rule 13(a) and in-
916
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Counterclaim practice has been liberalized to encourage the liti-
gation of all claims between the parties in one lawsuit and to avoid
multiplicity of litigation with all of its attendant evils--circuity of
action, inconvenience, waste of time and expense for both the
court and the parties, and possible injustice. 2 This policy against
multiplicity of litigation is basic to the philosophy of the Fed-
eral Rules; it lies behind the free joinder of claims by the plaintiff
under Rule 18 (a) and the liberal third-party practice of Rule 14.23
stead follows the previous New Jersey practice of requiring the assertion of
all set-offs. See N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2:26-190 (1937).
In California and the states following the California code model a de-fendant must "set up a counterclaim upon a cause arising out of the trans-
action set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim
.... " CAL. Civ. PRAc. CODE § 439. But only those claims which tend to
diminish or defeat plaintiff's recovery are classified as counterclaims, CAL.
CIV. Pahc. CODE § 438, and affirmative relief that does not do so can be
secured only by a cross-complaint which is always permissive. CAL. Civ.
PRAc. CODE § 442. See generally Comment, 1 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 547, 566-
68 (1954).
Arkansas provides that "the defendant must set out in his answer as
many grounds of defense, counter-claim or set-off . . . as he shall have."
A. STAT. § 27-1121 (1947). Since "counterclaim" under Arkansas law
includes all causes of action, ARK. STAT. § 27-1123 (1947), every claim
held by the defendant against the plaintiff must be pleaded or will be lost.
Corey v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 207 Ark. 284, 180 S.W.2d 570 (1944).
22. E.g., Parmelee v. Chicago Eye Shield Co., 157 F.2d 582, 586 (8th
Cir. 1946); Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, 161 F. Supp. 533, 536 (S.D.
N.Y. 1958); Madison Mercantile Prods., Inc. v. Frank Ix & Sons, Inc., 7
F.R.D. 615, 616 (D.NJ. 1947); Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 66 F. Supp.
872, 874 (W.D. Ky. 1946); Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Agar Mfg. Corp., 1
F.R.D. 579, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). In explaining the policy of the permissive
counterclaim provision of Rule 13, Dean (now Judge) Clark, Reporter
for the Advisory Committee, said:
[1]t is our theory of the action . . . that the civil action when
brought should include all the points of difference between the parties.
This is based on the theory that it is a sound and a desirable thing
that all spots of irritation between the parties should be brought out
into the open and should be fought over and disposed of at one time.
It saves trouble and waste on the part of everyone-the court and all
the court machinery and the parties, and it even (and perhaps this is
quite important) saves space for the ultimate recording of the re-
sult in the files in the clerk's office. So, as you will see, joinder of all
kinds as contemplated is very broad, indeed.
ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL
RULES 58-59 (1938).
The same policy lay behind the Federal Equity Rules. See Salt's Textile
Mfg. Co. v. Tingue Mfg. Co., 208 Fed. 156, 157-58 (D. Conn. 1913):
[Tlhe object and purpose of these new rules in equity, including rule
30, is to lessen costs for litigants in the court of equity, bring about
more speedy and effective relief to the parties therein, do away with
technical questions that may be a hindrance to speedy justice, and set-
tle all matters in controversy between the parties that may fairly arise
from the allegations of the complaint.
23. Of course, in any of these situations the judge may order sep-
arate trials "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice." FED. R.
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The Reporter of the Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules24
summed up the Committee's rationale as follows:
[I]t is desirable that all matters in dispute between litigants be
brought to issue and settled as quickly and directly as possible. In gen-
eral this can be best done in a single action. Such course saves time
and expense for the litigants and for the courts; it represents the dif-
ference between a single and permanent surgical operation as com-
pared to chronic physicking.m
The same policy underlies compelling the pleading of those
claims that arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the
principal action; it is intensified, however, by the belief that courts
should allow only one lawsuit over a single controversy, and all
logically related claims should be settled in that single action. 26 As
the Advisory Committee's Reporter explained it:
This is the general philosophy, which is a modem one of limiting the
number of lawsuits possible over one controversy. It is required rather
generally in these rules as well as in the pleading reform of the pres-
ent day that you should settle all matters that you start litigating in a
single action, and that it isn't the proper thing to have a defendant's
claim, arising out of the affair that must be litigated . . . the subject
matter for separate suit. The defendant should be forced to bring it in
and it should be settled at the same time.27
Although the compulsory counterclaim provision is effective
in carrying out the policy of the Federal Rules against multiplicity
of litigation, its severity seems anomalous. Rule 13(a) is the only
section of the Rules that seems contrary to their underlying phil-
osophy, and the underlying philosophy of procedural reform gen-
erally, of simplifying pleading requirements. 2s The Reporter said,
Civ. P. 42(b). For a discussion of the factors to be considered in exer-
cising this discretion, see generally Legislation, Recent Trends in Joinder of
Parties, Causes, and Counterclaims, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 462, 472-75
(1937).
24. Dean, now Judge, Charles E. Clark.
25. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase-
Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the
New Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 976, 977 (1937).
26. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d
Cir. 1961); Affiliated Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 509(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 3 F.R.D. 341 (E.D. Pa.
1943).
27. ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON THE FEDER-
AL RULEs 247 (1938) [hereinafter cited as CLEVELAND INSTITUTE].
28. The chairman of the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee, Wil-
liam Mitchell, stated that the Rules had three general objectives: (1) to
unite law and equity, (2) to serve as a model for state rules, and (3) to
provide simple and flexible rules without too much detail. CLEVELAND IN-
STITUTE 189. Cf. Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1955): One of the strands
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in explaining the Rules, "it seems to me [that] . . . on the whole
it is a little difficult to make such a serious mistake that you lose
your rights, and I think that is one of the advantages of the
rules."29 Yet Rule 13(a) provides an opportunity for just such a
serious mistake-a party who mistakenly does not plead a claim
logically related to those of his opponent does lose his rights. This
occurs, of course, when he incorrectly thinks his claim is not
logically related to his opponent's claim and chooses not to coun-
terclaim it. But it also occurs when the defendant's claim has not
fully ripened or has not even been ascertained when the action
begins. The obvious example of such an undiscovered but existing
claim is the possible latent injury suffered as a result of some tort
such as an automobile accident. A defendant who fails to plead
these injuries in a suit arising out of the accident would seem to be
foreclosed by Rule 13(a) from ever enforcing the claim.3" A
party may also fail to plead a compulsory counterclaim in a situ-
ation where the defendant is only nominally interested in the prin-
cipal suit, and the person who defends in fact has no interest in
asserting the nominal defendant's personal counterclaims. This
situation is most likely to occur where the defendant is insured and
the insurer takes over the lawsuit.3'
These harsh results arising from the apparent severity of Rule
13(a) can be tempered by equitable administration of the Rule.
Rule 13(f) provides for amendment of the pleadings for an omit-
of the underlying philosophy of the Rules "is a shift of emphasis from rigid
adherence to a prescribed procedure to a distinct effort to bring about the
disposition of every case on the merits without regard to compliance with
detailed requirements of adjective law . . . ."; Clark, The Handmaid of
Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 308 (1938): "The practically universal trend
of reform has been in favor of less binding and strict rules of form enforced
upon the litigants and their counsel . .. .
29. CLEVELAND INSTITUTE 219.
30. Another example of such a claim occurs in an action to recover
for the value of services rendered. There may be a defect in performance
which will not come to light until long after the principal suit, but which
is currently existing and actionable and therefore within Rule 13(a).
31. See Keller v. Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1951),
where defendant's insurer settled the claim of the plaintiff before defendant
asserted his counterclaim; under a counterclaim statute identical to Rule 13
(a), the court held that the defendant was barred from later asserting his
claim. It has been argued that this result is no different from the result
without the compulsory counterclaim rule, at least in those cases where the
insurer loses the suit. Wright, supra note 20, at 460-64.
Because of the possibility of latent injuries and of the defense of a neg-
ligence action by an insurer, the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil
Procedure of Minnesota recommended that tort claims not be included
under the compulsory counterclaim rule. Bench & Bar of Minn., Sept. 1950,
pp. 17-18. This recommendation was subsequently followed. See note 21
supra.
1962]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:913
ted counterclaim.32 This provision is liberally applied;" therefore,
an omitted counterclaim can quite easily be set up before the ac-
tion terminates. Even after judgment has been entered, Rule 60(b)
might be used to reopen the judgment;34 then, an amendment
could be allowed under Rule 13(f).11 Another way of restrain-
ing the harsh effect of Rule 13 (a) is dependent on the theory of its
enforcement. A compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13 (a) which
is not pleaded is clearly barred from being asserted later, but the
grounds for this bar are uncertain.3" Probably a majority of the
cases rest this bar on the res judicata concept of "merger" and
"bar"-the original action includes all counterclaims arising out of
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (f):
Omitted Counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counter-
claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or whenjustice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by
amendment.
33. See, e.g., Rosenberg Bros. v. Arnold, 283 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1960);
Safeway Trails, Inc. v. Allentown & Reading Transit Co., 185 F.2d 918
(4th Cir. 1950); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Shepard, 13 F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcnc- 13.33 (2d ed. 1948).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b):
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any other rea-
son justifying relief from the operation of the judgment ...
This rule is to be liberally construed and applied. E.g., Tozer v. Charles A.
Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951). But see Edwards v.
Velvac, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504, 507 (E.D. Wis. 1956), where the court re-
fused to open a judgment where the only "excusable neglect" was in failing
to make timely appeal under Rule 73(a), since "to use Rule 60(b) for the
purpose of circumventing another rule would be a perversion of the
rule and its purpose."
35. Cf. Williams v. Blitz, 226 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1955), where the
court remanded a default judgment to be set aside if delay in making an
answer asserting permissive counterclaims was due to excusable neglect.
36. "If the action proceeds to-judgment without the interposition of a
counterclaim as required by subdivision (a) of this rule, the counterclaim
is barred." Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 13, note 7, in 3A BARRON &
HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 17, at 439. Of the authorities cited in this
note of the committee, all of which deal with previous practice under Equi-
ty Rule 30, only two consider the grounds for the bar: Marconi Wireless
Tel. Co. v. National Elec. Signaling Co., 206 Fed. 295, 298 (E.D.N.Y.
1913) ("Rule 30 plainly requires that . . . all claims shall be litigated
in one suit, and that thus the matter shall be rendered res judicata and fu-
ture litigation avoided."), and SimnINs, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 663 (rev. ed.
Schweppe 1934) ("[A] counterclaim growing out of the cause of ac-
tion or subject-matter of the suit will be waived if not set up in the suit
under this rule."). That there is some confusion in the cases on this matter
is demonstrated by the statement in Union Paving Co. v. Downer Corp.,
276 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir. 1960), that "if a party fails to plead these
causes of action as counterclaims, he is held to have waived them and is
precluded by res judicata from ever suing upon them again."
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the same transaction or occurrence, and such counterclaims are
"merged" in a judgment for the party holding them and "barred"
by a judgment against him." Those cases which hold that the de-
fendant by failing to plead the compulsory counterclaim waives
the right to bring a later action (or is estopped from doing so)
may, however, lead to a better result .3  Such a rule gives the
court broader discretion to determine whether under the circum-
stances of the particular case the claim should be barred.-If the
defendant's claim was unknown to him at the time of the principal
action, he cannot be held to have waived it nor should he be
estopped from later asserting it; the same result should follow
when the defendant in the first suit had only a nominal interest.
In view of the potential harshness of the compulsory counterclaim
rule, it seems likely that the courts will employ the more flexible
waiver doctrine in a case where the defendant would otherwise be
deprived of an opportunity to litigate his claim."
Another basic criticism of Rule 13(a) is the unfairness with
which it may operate. It discriminates against the defendant since
he may be bound to bring a claim that the plaintiff would not be
forced to bring. The Rules provide only that "the plaintiff . . .
may join either as independent or as alternative claims as many
claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against the
opposing party."4 As this language clearly shows, plaintiff's join-
der of claims is completely permissive.41 Furthermore, the rule
37. E.g., Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 207 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954); Fantecchi v. Gross, 158 F. Supp. 684 (E.D.
Pa. 1957), appeal dismissed, 255 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 1958); Firemen's Ins.
Co. v. L. P. Steuart & Bro., 158 A.2d 675 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960). See
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1, 27 (1942);
Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HtAnv. L. REv. 818, 832(1952).
38. E.g., General Cas. Co. v. Fedoff, 11 F.R.D. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)(waiver); Douglas v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 81 F.
Supp. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (estoppel). For a complete statement of this ba-
sis for the bar and its effects, see generally Wright, supra note 20, at
428-36.
39. Courts generally do not favor a defense that bars a plaintiffs
otherwise valid claim; this is demonstrated by Judge Clark's remark that
"the defense of res judicata is universally respected, but actually not very
well liked." Riordon v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945) (dis-
senting opinion). Compare the statement in Ross v. T. C. Bateson Constr.
Co., 270 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1959): "Though the general policy of the
federal rules is to discourage separate actions which create a multiplicity of
suits, we should not become so engrossed with this idea of preventing mul-
tiple suits that we deprive a litigant of his day in court."
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). (Emphasis added.)
41. Velsicol Corp. v. Hyman, 103 F. Supp. 363, 366-67 (D. Colo. 1951).
Some commentators have suggested that plaintiffs be compelled to join all
of their claims, but the law has not yet followed this suggestion. E.g.,
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against splitting a cause of action (a part of the theory of res judi-
cata) does not preclude the plaintiff from bringing separate ac-
tions on claims that would fall within Rule 13(a) because the
"logical relationship" test for determining whether a counterclaim
is compulsory is much broader than the res judicata concept. 2
Another example of the unfairness of Rule 13(a) is that it may
work to take the initiative in bringing the action away from the
plaintiff. The plaintiff should be able to institute the action in the
court and at the time of his choice within the restrictions of venue
requirements and statutes of limitations," but under Rule 13(a)
a person against whom a legitimate claim is held may institute the
litigation by bringing an artificial claim arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the legitimate claim and force the in-
jured party to counterclaim."
The Federal Rules were designed to be "construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.""5
Blume, Required Joinder of Claims, 45 MicH. L. REv. 797, 812 (1947).
42. See Speed Prods., Inc. v. Tinnerman Prods., Inc., 222 F.2d 61 (2d
Cir. 1955), where plaintiff's claim should have been pleaded as a compul-
sory counterclaim in its reply to defendant's compulsory counterclaim,
but the plaintiffs failure to counterclaim could not be pleaded as a bar
under res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Cf. Ross v. T. C. Bateson Constr. Co., 270 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1959),
where the court held that a subcontractor in an action for damages caus-
ed by contractor's delayed performance was not barred by his earlier ac-
tion against the contractor for the value of his services. Yet it seems clear
that the contractor would have been forced to counterclaim any damages
he suffered through the subcontractor's delay in the original action. Eastern
Transp. Co. v. United States, 159 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1947).
43. Professor Millar argues that to take away the injured party's lib-
erty of assertion in this manner actually creates an inequality of advan-
tage between him and his opponent. MiLLAR, op. cit. supra note 6, at 137-
38. See Ohlinger, Jurisdiction, Venue and Process as to Counterclaims and
Third-Party Claims; Rules 13 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, 6 FED. B.J. 420, 432-33 (1945), where the author says that the
statutory right of convenience of venue should not be disposed of on the
grounds of avoiding multiplicity. See also DiGiovanni v. Camden Fire
Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 71 (1935), where the Court refused equitable relief
to avoid the burden of numerous suits and recognized that "the exercise
of equitable jurisdiction on this ground, while preventing a formal multi-
plicity of suits, would nevertheless be attended with more and deeper in-
convenience to the defendants than would be compensated for by the con-
venience of a single plaintiff . .. .
44. For instance, if an insurer brings an action to cancel a policy, the in-
sured must counterclaim to recover any benefits due under the policy.
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). A
declaratory judgment action to establish the insurer's liability will have the
same effect. Home Ins. Co. v. Trotter, 130 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1942).
45. FED. R. Crv. P. 1. Judge Holtzoff has stated that this rule "is no
mere precatory expression of a pious wish. It constitutes an enunciation
of the fundamental theory on which the structure was charted." Holtzoff,
supra note 28, at 1059.
NOTES
The importance of the "speedy" and "inexpensive" considerations
is illustrated by Rule 13(a); the framers of the Rules must have
been cognizant of the potential severity and possible injustice of a
compulsory counterclaim provision, yet they recommended and
the Supreme Court adopted Rule 13 (a).
II.
On April 25, 1938, the Supreme Court unexpectedly overturned
96 years of precedent in the federal judicial system.46 In 1842,
Swift v. Tyson4" had held that the Rules of Decision Act4 re-
quired the federal courts to enforce local state statutory law when
applicable, but it did not require them to follow the common law
as declared by the state courts; federal courts were free to apply
general common law without relying on state court pronounce-
ments. The theory of Swift v. Tyson was well stated 40 years later
by Mr. Justice Bradley: "the Federal courts have an independent ju-
risdiction in the administration of state laws, co-ordinate with, and
not subordinate to, that of the State courts, and are bound to ex-
ercise their own judgment as to the meaning and effect of those
laws."49 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins" overruled this doctrine by hold-
ing that federal courts are bound by the common law as it is de-
clared by state courts. The federal courts must follow state sub-
stantive law in resolving nonfederal questions whether the state law
is declared by the state legislature or by the state courts.51
46. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Much has been made
of the fact that the issue was not properly before the Court (it was not
raised either in the briefs or in the oral arguments) and of the anomaly
of Mr. Justice Brandeis, who had often refused to pass on improperly
raised questions, seemingly going far out of his way to decide Erie on these
grounds. E.g., Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and
the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 188-89 (1957).
47. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
48. "That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States in cases where they apply." Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789) (now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958)).
49. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33 (1883).
50. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
51. This change in the law is based in part on a change in judicial out-
look and in theories of jurisprudence. In 1938 the common law was no
longer viewed as "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular
State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute ....
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Now rights
are considered to exist only when created by a particular authority, and
when state-created rights are involved, they must be enforced as created.
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1945) (Frankfurter,
J.); Black & White Taxicab, supra at 532-36.
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The basis of the Erie decision was threefold:
First, the legislative history of the Rules of Decision Act had es-
tablished a congressional intention to require federal courts to fol-
low the established common law of the states as well as the
states' statutory laws;52 therefore, Swift v. Tyson was erroneous. 3
The validity of this construction of the act has been generally ac-
cepted54 and seems reasonable in view of the purpose of the act.
Second, the Constitution grants neither Congress nor the federal
courts power to declare rules of substantive law applicable to state-
created rights; therefore, Swift v. Tyson was unconstitutional. 5 Al-
though the Court expressly stated that it would not have abandon-
ed the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson but for its unconstitutionality,"5
this section of the opinion has been widely regarded as dictum57
52. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 81-88 (1923), which was referred to
as the "recent research of a competent scholar" in the Erie opinion. 304
U.S. at 72.
53. 304 U.S. at 71-74.
54. But see Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 558-59(1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); IA MooRE, FEDERAL PacvcE 0.3021]
(2d ed. 1961); Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CONELL
L.Q. 494,495-96 (1949).
55. 304 U.S. at 78-80. Mr. Justice Reed in a separate concurring
opinion objected to basing the decision on constitutional grounds. 304 U.S.
at 90-92. It appears that Mr. Justice Stone also had misgivings about the
strong constitutional language in the opinion, for he seems to have felt that
Congress might have power to enact substantive law to be applied in the
federal courts. See MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW
480-81 (1956). In addition to Reed's objections, two justices did not reach
the Swift v. Tyson issue. Since only eight Justices heard the case, if Stone
had also written a separate opinion on this point there would have been no
majority opinion. For the possible effect of this on the precedent value of
the opinion, see generally Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority
Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 99 (1956).
56. 304 U.S. at 77-78.
57. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 650 (1940); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brood-
ing Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Driver,
The Federal Civil Rules in Diversity Cases, 30 ORE. L. REv. 69, 71 (1950);
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doc-
trine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957); Note, 62 HARv. L.
REv. 1030, 1031-32 (1949); authorities cited in note 58 infra and in
Clark, supra at 273 n.27. But see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350
U.S. 198 (1956), a diversity case where the respondent argued that the
United States Arbitration Act, ch. 392, § 3, 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C.
§ 3 (1958), was applicable, making an arbitration clause in a contract
enforceable despite contrary state law. The Court said:
If respondent's contention is correct, a constitutional question might
be presented. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does
not have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable
to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases. . . . We therefore
read § 3 narrowly to avoid that issue.
350 U.S. at 202. Some commentators feel that this language revitalized
-and perhaps rather unsound dictum.5" Recently, however, some
commentators have recognized a constitutional basis for the Erie
doctrine in the make-up of the federal system.59 The exclusive
power of the states to make their own substantive law binding in
their own courts is unquestioned, and a separate federal law deal-
ing with state-created rights in federal courts cripples this state
power and may defeat legitimate state interests reflected in sub-
stantive law. Whether this consideration of federalism has consti-
tutional status or is only a matter of judicial discretion," it should
be a factor in any evaluation of the Erie doctrine.
Third, the Swift rule failed in its aim of promoting a general
common law uniform throughout the country and resulted in sub-
stantial injustice and discriminatory results; therefore, Swift v. Ty-
son was unwise. 61 The attempt to promote uniformity of law in
all American jurisdictions had failed because of the states' re-
fusals to adopt the federal courts' interpretation of the common
law, and the only effect of the doctrine was to prevent uniformity
in the administration of the law within each state. The outcome of
litigation should not depend on the fortuity of diversity of citizen-
ship and choice of a court. Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
was developed to protect the noncitizen from potentially biased
state courts, but it only gave him "another tribunal, not another
body of law."62 The application of independent rules of law in
the federal courts greatly discriminated against a citizen of the
forum state63 and encouraged the evils of forum-shopping between
state and federal courts by a noncitizen litigant. 6 Also, two sys-
the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitu-
tion, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 431-32 (1958).
58. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
136-47 (1942); IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.304 (2d ed. 1961);
Clark, supra note 57; Keeffe, supra note 54, at 496-97.
59. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 616-17, 633-35 (1954) (Erie expresses "a coherent and significant
principle of federalism."); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954) (Erie heightened "awareness of the
significance of issues of federal-state relationships . . ... "); Hill, The Erie
Doctrine and the Constitution (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541(1958) ("The problem is the role of the federal judiciary in our federal
system.").
60. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945), which
speaks of "a policy so important to our federalism .... " (Emphasis
added.)
61. 304 U.S. at 74-77.
62. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945).
63. As an example of such discrimination, the Erie opinion mentioned
the case of a noncitizen plaintiff who was able to take a nonsuit when de-
feated on a point of law in a state supreme court and subsequently prevail
by re-instituting the action in a federal court. 304 U.S. at 75 n.9.
64. The classic example of the evils of forum-shopping is Black &
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tems of courts adjudicating the same rights under different laws
created confusion and uncertainty about the state of the law.6"
The most difficult problem arising from the Erie case is when
must federal courts apply state law. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Erie,
spoke of state law applying to "substantive rules of common law."66
But the classification of law as substantive or procedural has
always been a perplexing and difficult task;67 subsequent de-
velopments in the Erie doctrine have made it more so.68
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,69 the Court revealed that the
Erie doctrine did not anticipate a classification of "substance" and
"procedure" in any traditional sense;7" instead, the Court develop-
ed an "outcome-determinative" test to ascertain the nature of a par-
White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
There a Kentucky corporation reincorporated in Tennessee in order that it
could sue to enjoin another Kentucky corporation on the basis of a con-
tract void under Kentucky law but enforceable under the federal common
law.
Of course, differences in substantive law are not the only reasons for
forum-shopping--character of judges and juries, crowdedness of dockets,
and availability of various procedural devices are all factors that weigh
heavily in the choice of a court. Hill, supra note 59, at 451. Also, the Erie
doctrine merely substitutes one type of forum-shopping for another, for
one with a claim against a person subject to the jurisdiction of several
federal districts can now forum-shop among the federal courts for the one
with the most favorable law.
65. The earlier rule of Swift v. Tyson did not contemplate such a sys-
tem. As pointed out above, courts operating under that rule were also at-
tempting to apply state law to state-created rights-they merely had a dif-
ferent conception of the nature of state law from those courts following the
Erie doctrine. See note 51 supra.
66. 304 U.S. at 78.
67. See generally CooK, op. cit. supra note 58, at 154-93; Tunks, Cate-
gorization and Federalism, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939).
68. See the discussion of the distinction between substance and proced-
ure in the scholarly opinion of Judge Magruder in Sampson v. Channell,
110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); this case was
instrumental in the shaping of the Erie doctrine. See also Curd, Substance
and Procedure in Rule Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34 (1948).
69. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
70.
But, of course, "substantive" and "procedural" are the same key-words
to very different problems. . . .Each implies different variables de-
pending upon the particular problem for which it is used ...
It is therefore immaterial whether statutes of limitation are charac-
terized either as "substantive" or "procedural" in State court opinions
in any use of those terms unrelated to the specific issue before us.
Id. at 108-09.
Compare this with the more traditional approach in Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), where the Court upheld Rules 35 & 37 as pro-
cedural within the meaning of the statute enabling the Court to formulate
procedural rules: "The test must be whether a rule really regulates pro-
cedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disre-
gard or infraction of them." Id. at 14.
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ticular rule or issue. Matters of substance, under this test, "signifi-
cantly affect the result of a litigation";" matters of procedure
concern "merely the manner and the means by which a right to re-
cover, as recognized by the State, is enforced .. ". ."" A federal
court adjudicating a state-created right in a case sits as if it were
another state court, and "the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules deter-
mine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court. 7 3
Obviously, the outcome-determinative test, if strictly applied in
diversity cases, would result in the application of many state rules
usually considered procedural. Almost any procedural rule can
conceivably affect the outcome of a case, and therefore, under
York, state rules would take precedence over federal rules when
the two conflict. A rigid rule like the outcome-determinative
test invites mechanical application since it considers only the pos-
sible effects of a federal rule on outcome without considering
the interests that the Erie doctrine was designed to protect.74
When that test alone is utilized, there is little room for consider-
ing whether the decision affects federal-state relationships, wheth-
er the possible change in outcome is potentially unjust to one of
the litigants, or whether following the federal rule actually encour-
ages forum-shopping.
A new approach to the application of the Erie doctrine was an-
nounced in 1958 in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.75
There the trial judge followed state practice by deciding the ex-
istence of facts supporting a statutory affirmative defense instead
of allowing the jury to decide the issue. The Supreme Court held
that the defense presented a fact question that was to be deter-
mined by the jury notwithstanding the contrary state rule. In
reaching this result, the Court first determined that the state prac-
71. 326 U.S. at 109.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. The Supreme Court has upheld state procedural rules over federal
rules in several cases in rather mechanical opinions. In Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), a state rule as to when
the statute of limitations is tolled (upon service of a summons) was applied
rather than Federal Rule 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the court."). In Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949), a state rule as to capacity to sue was applied rather than Federal
Rule 17(b) ("The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be de-
termined by the law under which it was organized."). In neither case did
the Court discuss the interests protected by Erie. Cf. Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Cor., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
75. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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tice of allowing the trial judge to decide the issue was merely "a
form and mode of enforcing the immunity" created by the de-
fense; it was not "an integral part of the special relationship created
by the statute . . . and not a rule intended to be bound up with
the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties. ' 6 The
Court conceded that if the outcome-determinative test alone were
used there would be a strong case for following state law; it then
found:
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here. . . . Thus the inquiry here is whether the federal policy favor-
ing jury decision of disputed fact questions should yield to the state
rule in the interest of furthering the objective that the litigation
should not come out one way in the federal court and another way in
the state court.
77
The Court ultimately held that the strong federal policy against
disruption of the judge-jury relationship was dominant in this
case.
78
Thus, the Byrd case sets out two tests for the application of
the Erie doctrine to diversity cases. (1) Is the state rule in ques-
tion an integral part of the state-created right? (2) Are there coun-
tervailing federal policies which call for an application of the fed-
eral rule? These tests may seem complex and difficult to apply,79
but when the factors the Court considered are examined, the tests
seem to mean little more than that the underlying state and federal
policies that are in conflict should be considered and weighed in
applying the Erie doctrine."0 This approach forces a consideration
76. Id. at 536.
77. Id. at 537-38.
*78. It has been argued that the Byrd case was decided contrary to state
law only because of the strong federal interest in preserving the jury trial.
43 MiNN. L. REv. 580 (1959). If the Court had wished to base its deci-
sion on the basis of a right to jury determination, however, they could have
much more easily, and much more consistently with previous cases
promulgating the Erie doctrine, decided the case solely on seventh amend-
ment grounds. This it failed to do. Only after a full discussion of the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts did the Court note that the policy is
"perhaps even more . . . [clear] in light of the influence of the Seventh
Amendment . . . ." 356 U.S. at 539.
79. Hill, supra note 59, at 609, says "The . . . [Byrd] case represents
a desirable step away from the mechanical application of the outcome-
determinative principle, but instead of abating the confusion will probably
aggravate it, as federal judges struggle with two new tests more complex
than the one replaced."
80. Lower federal courts seem to have adopted this broad interpreta-
tion of the case. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir.
1960), a declaratory judgment was dismissed because of a direct state
policy against such actions in suits involving insurance claims. The court
noted that "an increasing emphasis has been placed on the consideration
928
of the interests protected by the Erie doctrine; thus, the court not
only may but must consider the effect of its decision on federal-
state relationships and the possible appearance of the evils that the
Erie doctrine was designed to prevent. The Byrd case, however,
does not represent an overruling of the outcome-determinative test,
or even a modification of it, but merely applies the test in a
judicious manner.
mr.
The ultimate question is now raised: Is Rule 13(a) applicable
in federal courts when sitting under their diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction, or does the Erie doctrine force these courts to apply
state law in determining which, if any, counterclaims must be
pleaded? Almost half the states do not compel the pleading of any
counterclaims, and the compulsory counterclaim provisions of some
of the other states apply to different claims or have an effect dif-
ferent from Rule 13 (a)." In these states the applicability of Rule
13(a) to diversity cases is crucial to those who have failed to set
up a counterclaim compulsory under Rule 13(a) and, more of-
ten, to those merely deciding what they must plead.
If the rigid outcome-determinative test set out in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York"2 is used, there can be little doubt that the
compulsory counterclaim rule is within the Erie doctrine. This nec-
essitates the application of state law whether or not it is consistent
with Rule 13(a). A rule that acts to preclude a party from stating
and accommodation of the basic state and federal policy goals involved.
• . . A proper line of inquiry must assess the competing policy goals of
the two sovereigns." Id. at 243-44. In Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills,
Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J.), the court held that the rules
governing the validity of service of process on foreign corporations are a
matter of federal law in diversity cases because the jurisdiction of federal
courts is so involved in their make-up; Byrd was characterized as repre-
senting a "significant development .. . in making more flexible the out-
come-determinative test for the application of the Erie doctrine." Id. at513. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281. F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960), held that
evidence inadmissible in the state court was admissible in federal court be-
cause of the following two "countervailing considerations": the necessity of
allowing a court to regulate its own trials and the liberality with which evi-
dence is to be received under Federal Rule 43(a). In Iovino v. Waterson,
274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960), Federal
Rule 25(a) (1), which allows substitution of parties in case of death, was
given effect over a contrary state rule because of the lack of an affirma-
tive state policy against revivor despite the outcome-determinative test.
But see, e.g., Berger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 666(10th Cir. 1961), where the outcome-determinative test was strictly and
mechanically applied with the result that the court followed the state rule
controlling election of remedies.
81. See note 21 supra.
82. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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his claim at all is certainly outcome-determinative. The York case
itself presented almost the exact converse of the compulsory coun-
terclaim situation. There the Court, in holding a state statute of
limitations applicable in a diversity case, said:
Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery in a
suit if brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally
and not merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so in-
timately affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity
case should follow State law.83
Since the application of Rule 13 (a) in a diversity case would bar
recovery in a federal court on a claim not pleaded in an earlier
suit---even though the claim would be enforceable in the second
action if both suits had been brought in a state court 4 -it seems
reasonable to assume that the same court would have decided
both cases the same way.
The outcome-determinative test applied in this manner goes
far to frustrate the objective of the Federal Rules to provide a
uniform procedure for all cases in the federal courts since almost
any procedural rule can conceivably be outcome-determinative in
this strict sense. 5 The Court in following York actually did make
83. Id. at 110.
84. Of course, a different problem arises if the fit suit is in a state
court and the second suit is in a federal court. The federal statute imple-
menting the full faith and credit clause requires that state judicial pro-
ceedings "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State . . . from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
This language would seem to require the federal court to apply the law of
the state to define the scope of the previous action. See Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 481 (1813); Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLTJM. L. REV. 330 (1944).
Several federal courts have applied state law in such a situation. Zion v.
Sentry Safety Control Corp., 258 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1958); Grodsky v. Sipe,
30 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. I1. 1940); cf. Gramm v. Lincoln, 257 F.2d 250,
255 (9th Cir. 1958). Likewise, since federal court judgments are entitled
to full faith and credit from state courts, Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165
(1938), Rule 13(a) should have the same effect in a subsequent state court
action as it would in federal court. Several state courts have reached
this result, and by assuming that Rule 13(a) barred the claim, refused re-
lief. Home v. Woolever, 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d 378 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 951 (1960); Gross v. Fantecchi, 8 Cumb. 148 (Pa. C.P.
1958). Contra, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Haney, 235 Miss. 60, 108 So. 2d 227,
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1959), criticized in 73 HiRv. L. REv. 1410
(1960).
85. Many commentators, with varying sympathies, realized this result
would undermine the uniformity of procedure that is the goal of the
Federal Rules. E.g., Driver, supra note 57, at 76; Hart, supra note 59, at
510-11; Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 718 (1950); Clark, Book Review, 36 CORNELL
L.Q. 181, 183 (1950).
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several of the Federal Rules in effect inapplicable to diversity
cases. Rule 3, which states that an action commences when the
complaint is filed, was held not to determine the point at which a
state statute of limitations is tolled where the law of the forum
state requires service of summons to toll the statute; 6 Rule 17(b),
which states that the capacity of a corporation to sue is determin-
ed by the law of the state where it was organized, was held not to
apply if the corporation does not have capacity to sue under the
law of the forum state;" Rule 23(b), which states the condi-
tions precedent to the bringing of a stockholder's derivative suit in
the federal courts, was held not to exclude the additional condi-
tions imposed on such suits by the forum state. 8 The Court has
also narrowly construed a federal statute independent of the Fed-
eral Rules, the United States Arbitration Act, to make it inap-
plicable in a diversity case. 9
"But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here,"9 just as there were in the Byrd case. Applying a contrary
state rule rather than Rule 13 (a) in diversity cases is a threat to
the federal interest in reducing multiplicity of litigation and to the
federal policy of settling all related claims in a single action. On
It has been argued that the outcome-determinative test is inapplicable
to the Federal Rules. "[lilt is submitted that when Congress has exercised
that power [over federal court procedure] it has in a sense 'occupied'
the field and the test should be whether the rule has any relation as to
how a federal court shall conduct its business. If it does, the rule should
be upheld." GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 15, at 43 (3d ed. 1949). See
Note, 39 GEo. L.J. 600 (1951). This is essentially the test used to determine
the validity of the rules under the Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958),
which requires that the "rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right" of any litigant. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Mur-
phree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
See note 70 supra.
86. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949).
87. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
88. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
89. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
All of the cases mentioned above can be distinguished from the compul-
sory counterclaim situation because they all involve situations where the
federal law requires the federal courts to adjudicate a claim that cannot be
heard in the state courts; under Rule 13(a), federal courts are foreclosed
from adjudicating a claim which state courts would hear. Thus, the Rule
13(a) situation seems similar to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dictum in York
recognizing the power of Congress to curtail the power of the federal
courts through the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 326 U.S. at 105. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act example is distinguishable, however, since it merely denies
a litigant a federal remedy without affecting his substantive rights under
state law. Rule 13(a) does affect those rights since it should have the same
effect in a subsequent state court action as it would in a subsequent fed-
eral court action. See note 84 supra.
90. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
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the other hand, absence of a state compulsory counterclaim rule is
not an integral part of any state-created right and may only signify
an absence of any state policy in regard to reducing multiplicity
of litigation. The only state interests to be served by not compelling
counterclaims is a feeling of fairness toward one forced to come
into the litigation and a possible recognition of the historic right
of the plaintiff to institute litigation. When the federal courts are
utilized, these considerations are subordinated to the interests of
the parties and the courts in settling all related matters in one law-
suit.
Moreover, this is not the type of uniform federal rule which pro-
motes the evils that the Erie doctrine was designed to prevent. It
seems unlikely that any litigant would choose one court over an-
other merely because one of them has a compulsory counterclaim
rule; at least this is not as likely as is forum-shopping on the basis
of other procedural advantages that definitely do not come within
the Erie doctrine (such as the improved discovery methods of the
Federal Rules or the opportunity for jury determination of a cru-
cial issue as in the Byrd case). In balance, there seems to be no
sound reason for applying state law in lieu of Rule 13 (a) in di-
versity actions despite the potentially changed outcome of future
litigation, but there are federal interests that can only be protect-
ed by its application.
The Byrd case seems to indicate a new vitality for those Federal
Rules, like Rule 13(a), that were jeopardized by strict adherence
to the outcome-determinative test. Those Rules that are based on
a strong federal interest should now survive an attack on the basis
of the Erie doctrine whatever their effect on the outcome of the
case.
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